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TORTS- DEATH ASA RESULT OF WORRY.OVER LIBEL-SURVIVAL OF
ACTIONS - LEGAL CAUSE - Plaintiff, administratrix of her husband's estate,
brought an action against defendant newspaper to recover damages for the death
of her husband, which she claimed resulted from worry over an alleged libel
that defendant published. The trial court sustained defendant's demurrer to the
declaration and plaintiff appealed. Held, since the "survival statute" 1 does not
preserve actions affecting character, the libel abated with the husband's death;
and since mental anguish, worry, £ear and loss of health are the several results
of the wrongful act of libel, they cannot be made the basis of a new cause of
action. Judgment for defendant affirmed. Benton 'lJ, Knoxville News-Sentinel
Co., 174 Tenn. 658, 130 S. W. (2d) 105 (1939).2
Probably the greatest task in a case like the principal one, disregarding any
difficulty arising from the theory of pleading doctrine,8 would be to convince
the court that a defamatory statement may give rise to more than one cause of
action. In the principal case the plaintiff might argue that in addition to a libel
suit, the intes~te had an action on the case for physical injuries because of
words wrongfully published.4 There is no doubt but that a single wrongful act
may invade two or more legally protected rights or interests of a single plaintiff.
But it is not certain that two or more causes of action will arise in favor of the
plaintiff under such circumstances. Some courts 5 recognize several separate
and distinct causes of action, if the several rights invaded by the defendant's
wrongful act are sufficiently different to make it impractical or inconvenient to
blend them in one suit. Other courts hold that a violation of the plaintiff's
several rights gives only one cause of action with several items of damage.«1
Tenn. Code· (Micliie, 1938), § 8694.
The briefs of both parties to the suit were made available to the writer through
the generosity of Messrs. Graham & Davis of Knoxville, attorneys for the plaintiff.
In a companion case between the same parties, 174 Tenn. 661, 130 S. W.
(2d) 106. (1939),. the plaintiff sued as the intestate's widow. She sought to recover:
(1) for damage to her reputation, because of the libel on her husband; (2) for
injuries arising as a ~esult of her damaged reputation; (3) for the jeopardy of her
security and happiness which the libel caused by losing the husband his prestige in
business and thereby affecting the family income. The court held that one other than
the libeled person can recover only when special damages have been suffered, and that
.in the case before the court the wife failed to allege any special damages.
8 See Mescall v. Tully, 91 Ind. 96 ( 1883); Fox v. Wallace, 88 Ind. App. 2.35,
151 N. E. 835 (1926); CLARK, ConE PLEADING 174-179 (1938). It does not
appear that the doctrine is part of Tennessee's law. See Tenn. Code (Michie, 1938),
§ 8729; but see Crownover, "Procedural Simplification," 12 TENN. L. REv. 90
(1934).
4 The plaintiff's brief advanced the theory that the libel "merged in the greater
wrong'' which caused the intestate's death.
5 See Reilly v. Sicilian Asphalt Paving Co., 170 N. Y. 40, 62 N. E. 772 (1902),
for a discu5?ion of the English cases.
6 Doran v. Cohen, 147 Mass. 342, 17 N. E. 647 (1888); King v. Chicago,
M. & St. P. Ry., 80 Minn. 83, 82 N. W. III3 (1900); Von Fragstein v. Windler,
1
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But since courts will not allow recovery for physical injuries in libel or slander
actions, 7 the alternatives must be to deny that such interests are protected by the
law or to permit the bringing of another suit. In view of the many cases allowing recovery for physicai injuries and even for mental suffering, resulting from
non-defamatory words wrongfully uttered,8 the first alternative does not seem
to accord with either authority or reason. It is true that there does not appear to
be a single case directly holding that recovery may be had in a suit in the nature
of an action on the case for physical injuries suffered because of the utterance
of defamatory words.9 But it is difficult to understand why recovery should
be denied just because the words causing damage happened to be defamatory.10
It is submitted that a court would not deny recovery merely on such grounds,
if the issue were squarely presented.11 Another problem confronting the plaintiff
in the instant case would be to bring the intestate's cause of action within
Tennessee's counterpart of the Lord Campbell Act. This statute preserves "the
right of action" which one "whose death is caused by the wrongful act, omission,
or killing by another, would have had against the wrongdoer, in case death had
not ensued." 12 Literally the phrase "wrongful act" as used in the statute is

2 Mo. App. 598 (1876) (brief statement of point decided). These cases, as well as
those referred to in note 5, are concerned with injury to the person and property,
and the courts holding that separate causes of action arose thought important the
difference as to alienability and abatement of the causes of action and the differences in
periods of limitation.
1 See, for example, Cyrowski v. Polish-American Pub. Co., 196 Mich. 648, 163
N. W. 58 (1917); Terwilliger v. Wands, 17 N. Y. 54 (1858). See also, Butler v.
Hoboken Printing & Publishing Co., 73 N. J. L. 45, 62 A. 272 (1905); Oehler v.
L. Bamberger & Co., 4 N. J. Misc. 1003, 135 A. 71 (1926), affd. 103 N. J. L.
703, 137 A. 425 (1927). Still it is commonly held that mental suffering alone is a
proper element of damage in a defamation suit. Johnson v. Crow, (La. App. 1935)
158 So. 857; Thorson v. Albert Lea Pub. Co., 190 Minn. 200, 251 N. W. 177
(1933); Newby v. Times-Mirror Co., 46 Cal. App. no, 188 P. 1008 (1920).
8 Wilkson v. Downton, [ l 897] 2 Q. B. 57; Barnett v. Collection Service Co.,
214 Iowa 1303, 242 N. W. 25 (1932); Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 208
N. W. 814 (1926); Bielitski v. Obodiak, 65 Dom. L. R. 627 (Sask. 1922). See
also a review of the cases in Harper and McNeely, "A Re-examination of the Basis
for Liability for Emotional Distress," 1938 Wis. L. REV. 426.
9 But see Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 208 N. W. 814 (1926).
10 Perhaps the point has not been raised before the instant case.
11 Of course, the two alternatives do not exhaust the possibilities. The courts
might allow compensation for such physical injuries in defamation actions just as they
do for mental suffering. JohnsQn v. Crow, (La. App. 1935) 158 So. 857; Thorson
v. Albert Lea Pub. Co., 190 Minn. 200, 251 N. W. 177 (1933); Newby v. TimesMirror Co., 46 Cal. App. no, 188 P. 1008 ( 1920). But it would seem that the interest
in one's honor and reputation is so different from the interest in freedom from
physical injury that recovery for the latter should not be confined to the stereotyped
forms of defamation actions.
12 Tenn. Code (Michie, 1938), § 8236. It should be observed that this statute
is of the type commonly called "survival" statutes. It does not create a new cause of
action in the deceased person's representatives, but merely preserves the causes of action
that occurred prior to his death. Whaley v. Catlett, 103 Tenn. 347, 53 S. W. 131

(1899).
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broad enough to include spoken or written words,13 resulting in physical injury
or death. However, there appears to have been no such interpretation of the
statute.14 While the absence of precedent is significant, especially since the Lord
Campbell Act and, statutes modeled after it are now well overlaid with case
13:w, still this fact alone is not a complete answer to the plaintiff's case.15 It would
seem that the principal case falls within the purpose of such statutes. Another
difficulty confronting the plaintiff arises from the limitations imposed by the
doctrine of proximate or legal cause. The court might differentiate between
intentional and negligent defamation. If the case involved the former, the
court should probably allow recovery; 16 but if the defendant's act were merely
negligent, the answer is not so clear. There are some cases, though not precisely
in ~int, which would seem to support the plaintiff,17 but it would seem that so
long. as "foreseeability" is to continue as one test of legal cause, the logical
decision would be the one denying recovery on the facts immediately under
consideration.18 Moreover, if "considerations of fairness, justice, and social
policy" are to govern "what consequences are legal," 19 such a decision seems the
proper one.
Edmund R. Blaske

13 See Staines v. Central Ry., 72 N. J. L. 268, 61 A. 385 (1905); However,
see Cardozo, J., in Ultramores Corp. v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170 at 185, 174 N. E.
441 (1931).
-14 The absence of precedent is very likely due to the rarity of such cases in fact.
15 The original Lord Campbell Act was enacted in 1846. 9 & 10 Viet., c. 93.
16 See citations in note 8, supra.
17 See Prosser, "Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort," 37
M1cH. L. REV. 874 (1939); Kenney v. Wong Len, 81 N. H. 427, 128 A. 343
(1925); Harper and McNeely, "A Re-examination of the Basis for Liability for Emotional Distress," 1938 Wis. L. REV. 426.
18 As a matter of experience, it would seem that there is great improbability that
physical injury will result from the publication of a libel. Compare, Terwilliger v.
Wands, 17 N. Y. 54 {1858), and Butler v. Hoboken Printing & Pub. Co., 73 N. J. L.
45, 62 A. 272 (1905).
19 HARPER, TORTS, § 110, P· 258 (1933).

